

This listing of claims will replace all prior versions, and listings, of claims in the application:

Listing of Claims:

Claims 1-3. (canceled)

Claim 4. (currently amended) A method for authenticating key devices using an asymmetric encryption method in which each key device is assigned a device-specific certificate, the method comprising the steps of:

assigning each key device a group-specific ~~signature-key~~public key; and
assigning each key device a group-specific signature of the device-specific certificate;
wherein a group is comprised of a limited total number of key devices.

Claim 5. (currently amended) The method according to claim 4, wherein the group-specific ~~signature-key~~public key and the group-specific signature of the device-specific certificate are allocated to each key device during a first initialization.

Claim 6. (currently amended) The method according to claim 4, wherein the steps of assigning the group-specific ~~signature-key~~public key and the group-specific signature of the device-specific certificate to an associated specific group are each determined by comparing each key device with a stored list of approved key devices.

Claim 7. (currently amended) The method according to claim 4, further comprising the steps of:

establishing a link between at least two key devices;
transmitting a corresponding device-specific certificate and a corresponding device-specific ~~signature-key~~public key from one of the key devices to another one of the key devices, the another one of the key devices verifying authenticity of the corresponding device-specific

certificate using the corresponding device-specific ~~signature-key~~public key according to the relationship:

$$D(S(Z(A)), pAD) = D(E(Z(A)), sAD), pAD = Z(A)$$

where D represents a decryption function, S(Z(A)) represents signature of the corresponding device-specific certificate, E(Z(A)) represents an encryption function of the corresponding device-specific certificate, pAD represents a ~~signature-key~~public key of an administrator, sAD represents a secret key of the administrator, and Z(A) represents the corresponding device-specific certificate.

Claim 8. (new) The method for authenticating key devices using an asymmetric encryption method in which each key device is assigned a device-specific certificate, the method comprising the step of:

assigning each key device a group-specific public key, wherein a group comprised of a limited total number of key devices;

assigning each key device a group-specific signature of the device-specific certificate;

establishing a link between at least two key devices;

transmitting a corresponding device-specific certificate and a corresponding device-specific signature from one of the key devices to another one of the key devices.

Claim 9. (new) The method according claim 9, further comprising the step of:

verifying authenticity of the corresponding device-specific certificate using the corresponding group-specific public key according the relationship by the another one of the key devices:

$$D(S(Z(A)), pAD) = D(E(Z(A)), sD), pAD = Z(A)$$

where D represents a decryption function, S(Z(A)) represents signature of the corresponding device-specific certificate, E(Z(A)) represents an encryption function of the corresponding device-specific certificate, pAD represents a public key of an administrator, sAD

represents a secret key of the administrator and $Z(A)$ represents the corresponding device-specific certificate.

Claim 10. (new) The method for authenticating key devices using an asymmetric encryption method in which each key device is assigned a device-specific certificate, the method comprising the steps of:

assigning each key device a group-specific public key, wherein a group comprised of a limited total number of key devices; assigning each key device a group-specific signature of the device-specific certificate;

establishing a link between at least two key devices transmitting a corresponding device-specific certificate and a corresponding device-specific signature from one of the key devices to another one of the key devices, wherein the other one of the key devices verifying authenticity of the corresponding device-specific certificate using the corresponding group-specific public key according the relationship:

$$D(S(Z(A)), pAD) = D(E(Z(A), sAD), pAD) = Z(A)$$

where D represents a decryption function, $S(Z(A))$ represents signature of the corresponding device-specific certificate, $E(Z(A))$ represents an encryption function of the corresponding device-specific certificate, pAD represents a public key of an administrator, sAD represents a secret key of the administrator, and $Z(A)$ represents the corresponding device-specific certificate.

Claim 11. (new) The method according claim 10, wherein the group-specific public key and the group-specific signature of the device-specific certificate are allocated to each key device during a first initialization.

Claim 12. (new) The method according claim 8, wherein the steps of assigning the group-specific public key and the group-specific signature of the device-specific certificate to an

associated specific group are each determined by comparing each key device with a stored list of approved key devices.